Dalibor Rohac

Against the background of turbulent transatlantic relations, the visit this week of Poland’s new president, Karol Nawrocki, to Washington was deemed a success. US president Donald Trump affirmed continuation of US commitment to Poland’s security and invited Poland to join G20, in a testament to the country's impressive economic record. Yet the trip also leaves a bitter aftertaste by exposing the depth of Poland’s political divisions. These splits are starting to affect Poland’s ability to throw around its weight on the global stage – precisely at a moment when Poland’s voice is more needed than ever.

The news that came out of Georgia late on Saturday was as saddening as it was predictable. For weeks, the country’s ruling party, the Russia-aligned Georgian Dream (GD), were advertising that they saw no alternative to staying in power following the rigged parliamentary election – promising a ban on opposition parties and even 'Nuremberg trials'. If there is any surprise at all, it is the sheer brazenness with which GD tilted the results in its favour. There were widespread violations of vote secrecy, including tracking voters outside polling stations, verbal threats and violence.

Has France’s far right just made a 180-degree turn on Ukraine? The leader of the National Rally, Jordan Bardella, expressed his support for sending 'ammunition and equipment [Ukraine] needs to hold the front' at a recent arms fair. Last year, Bardella stated 'the war would not end without a withdrawal of Russian troops and a return of complete and full sovereignty of Ukraine on the territories that are currently occupied by Russia'. Bardella, just like other figures on France’s nationalist right is hedging his bets. He is, for example, against sending 'equipment that could have consequences of escalation in Eastern Europe'. Likewise, Marion Maréchal, the niece of Marine Le Pen, wishes for Ukraine’s victory but does not want to see Ukraine join Nato.

If one story dominates the cacophony of results of the European election from across the 27 countries of the Union, it is the defeat of incumbents in the EU’s largest member states: France and Germany. While their underperformance was expected, its aftershocks risk leaving Europe weak and ineffectual in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine.  It is hard to see how Macron or Scholz will become bolder in their Ukrainian positions in the coming months In France, president Emmanuel Macron responded to the poor performance of his party, Renaissance, by calling a snap election for 30 June – less than two weeks before Nato’s summit in Washington.  The logic of his decision is simple: it is better to confront the National Rally (RN) of Jordan Bardella now than in 2027.

Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico is fighting for his life in hospital after being shot several times. While it is impossible to fully flesh out the consequences of today’s assassination attempt, it is safe to say that the event is a dramatic game changer for Slovak, and potentially for Central European, politics. During a meet and greet with the public following a cabinet meeting in the small mining town of Handlová, a man reportedly shouted at Fico, 'Rob, come here,' before shooting at him three or four times aiming at his chest and abdomen. The prime minister fell on the ground before being taken by his protection officers to the car and then on to the hospital in Banská Bystrica. His alleged attacker has been arrested.

What should we make of the recent hardening of Emmanuel Macron’s position on the war in Ukraine? At the beginning of the conflict, France’s president spent countless hours talking with Vladimir Putin; now, he spends his time entertaining scenarios in which French troops could be sent to Ukraine, and calling on other European leaders to stop being 'cowards'. The Wall Street Journal reports today that Macron used secret conversations with US president Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to get them to change the way they deal with Ukraine. What explains Macron's new approach?

As Donald Trump marches towards the Republican nomination, a question hangs over Europe: how should the continent prepare for a world in which Nato becomes dead letters? For some, the answer is ‘strategic autonomy’; for others, it lies in procuring as much US-made kit as possible to buy goodwill with the future administration. One obvious response, however, has been left by the wayside: nuclear deterrence. When it comes to Trump-proofing the security of Eastern Europe, few measures would be as effective as arming the largest country of the region – Poland – with nuclear weapons.

In 2019, France’s president Emmanuel Macron famously called Nato ‘braindead’. Think what you will about the health of the defence alliance, but it is increasingly the European Union, not Nato, that seems paralysed, unable to think more than just a step ahead.  The EU has been trundling along in this state for some time now. On the European Commission’s recommendation, EU leaders are due to make a decision next week about opening accession negotiations with Ukraine. Yet, little groundwork has been laid to turn even this initial step into a success. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán has already fired his opening salvo, refusing to even discuss the issue and threatening to derail the €50 billion (£42.8 billion) fund set aside to assist Ukraine over the years 2024-2027.

Pranked by a Kremlin-friendly comedy duo, Italy’s Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, spoke for many when she confessed her 'fatigue' with the war in Ukraine. But there is some bad news for all the Europeans 'tired' of the conflict. Europe’s real job will only begin when the current war of attrition eventually congeals along more or less static lines, with or without a formal armistice.  The task ahead will not only involve physical reconstruction, budget support, or bringing Ukraine closer to EU membership. Much more importantly, it will involve guaranteeing the stability of whatever formal or informal settlement arises from the war.

If it continues to hold, the likely electoral victory of Poland’s opposition last night is good news for all those concerned by the health of Polish democracy. In a recent piece in The Atlantic, Anne Applebaum painted a dire picture of creeping state capture, suggesting that in some ways, 'Poland already [resembled] an autocracy,' and eloquently arguing why the election campaign was 'neither free nor fair.'  She has a point. Yet, notwithstanding the ruling party’s vicious and paranoia-driven campaign, the election was bound to be a highly competitive one. But even if the Law and Justice Party (PiS) won enough mandates to form a government, it would hardly be in a position to place the country on a one-way path to authoritarianism.