Taliban

There is a war on. Not in Libya but in Helmand, where nearly 9,000 British troops are fighting. Last year was in fact the deadliest of more than nine years of war for Afghan civilians, the United Nations has just reported. You would not know it, though. For the events in North Africa have almost removed the issue entirely from the newspapers. When Hamid Karzai came through London recently, his visit barely registered. What a change from only half a year ago when every one of his idiosyncratic utterances would be replayed and over-analysed.   This may not be an altogether bad thing. Too much 24-hour coverage can make it

USO is not what it once was. The days of Bob Hope’s wisecracking have receded into the past, and ogled Playmates no longer sex their way across stages. The Pentagon has commissioned British theatrical talent to educate its troops about Afghanistan’s political culture and history. Performed by the Kilburn Tricycle Theatre, The Great Game is a 7 hour show about Afghanistan’s cycles of invasion, struggle and victory. Presumably if the grunts can withstand that, they can withstand anything. As Ben Macintyre notes in the Times (£), there is neither greatness nor beauty in the games that Western powers have played in Afghanistan. But, unencumbered by imperial guilt and hubristic in

Today I joined number of leading Afghan experts, from Ahmed Rashid to Gilles Dorronsoro, in calling on President Obama to change the American strategy in Afghanistan. Based on our work in and on Afghanistan, we wanted to make a number of points just as the White House begins reviewing its strategy: First, that the cost of the war is now over $120 billion per year for the United States alone. This is unsustainable in the long run. Second, despite these huge costs, the situation on the ground is much worse than a year ago because the Taliban insurgency has made progress across the country. The military campaign is suppressing, locally and temporarily, the symptoms of the

The Times (£) is reporting that ISAF has made a significant progress in pacifying the death circle around Sangin. The key, it seems, is driving a wedge between the tribal insurgents and religious insurgents foreign to Helmand: ‘British commanders believe that they are close to achieving a significant tribal uprising against the Taleban that could lead to the reintegration of hundreds of insurgents fighting around Sangin, the most dangerous place in Afghanistan. The number of violent incidents in Sangin has fallen by about 80 per cent in the past month. British commanders believe that this is partly the result of tribal leaders delivering on a promise to restrain tribal elements

So what is Pakistan up to? Cameron has a point: it is playing a dangerous double game which I once outlined in a piece. But in today’s Spectator, it is all spelled out by a writer who is – in my view – the best authority on this mess and by some margin. Ahmed Rashid, whose book Descent into Chaos is the definitive work on the Afghan war, explains that Karzai has effectively switched sides – he’s given up on Nato (as, it seems, has Cameron) and now wants Pakistan to preside over talks with the Taliban: ” A few months ago Hamid Karzai would have been thrilled to have

The leaked communiqué, obtained by the Independent on Sunday, stating that British troops will not be fighting in Afghanistan by 2014 has further confused the Afghan war at a time when clarity is necessary.  There are now two deadlines, or aspirations of a withdrawal at any rate. Liam Fox is polluting the airwaves with specious waffle about 2015 being a ‘conservative assessment’, but of course the troops will probably be home earlier, but then again they might not, but then again we don’t really know. Well, Dr Fox, if that’s the case it’s best to say nothing. Amid this disorder, Andrew Mitchell has announced that aid to Afghanistan will be

The proverbial shoe is dropping. Following General Stanley McChrystal’s forced retirement, a consensus is forming that President Obama’s Afghan strategy is not working. The Economist says: ‘Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country’s soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal’s plan was for a “surge” that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan’s government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened.’ In the Financial Times, Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point, arguing that the military strategy in Afghanistan is “failing”. ‘The real crisis, however, is that the US-Nato strategy

Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. diplomat in charge of Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs said Washington has now publicly made clear the US government is serious about negotiating with the Taliban. Speaking at a conference in Madrid, the US envoy said: ‘Let me be clear on one thing, everybody understands that this war will not end in a clear-cut military victory. It’s not going to end on the deck of a battleship like World War Two, or Dayton, Ohio, like the Bosnian war It’s going to have some different ending from that, some form of political settlements are necessary … you can’t have a settlement with al Qaeda, you can’t talk to

A few days after President Barack Obama flew to Kabul to look Hamid Karzai in the eye and demand that he combat corruption, drugs, crime and the influence of notorious warlords in his government, President Karzai has blamed foreigners, including UN and EU officials, for “very widespread” fraud during presidential and provincial elections last year. He is quoted as telling a meeting of election officials: “There was fraud in presidential and provincial council elections – no doubt that there was a very widespread fraud, very widespread … But Afghans did not do this fraud. The foreigners did this fraud.” As insane notions go this one is quite extraordinary – even