Military

Self-interested Britain

Liam Fox is in the most invidious position. It is hard enough to secure significant budget cuts against vested interests that maintain anti-competitive procurement; and being at war deepens the task. Cuts of 10 to 20 percent must be made but at the same time Fox acknowledges, in an interview with the Telegraph, that: ‘We have to keep sufficient land forces to hold territory if required, we have got to maintain enough maritime power and we have got to maintain air power to maintain air superiority.’ Like all defence secretaries, Fox is trying to contain the warring service chiefs, their temperaments exacerbated by the coming cuts. Fox is even handed.

The RAF is in danger of being destroyed on the ground

Liam Fox is anticipating the Strategic Defence Review, preparing the services for what will be extremely bad news. Britain will not engage in large scale operations in the immediate future. The Telegraph reports that officials intend to reduce the number of strike aircraft, warships and tanks. Future strategic emphasis will be on maximising firepower and range and minimising direct and associated costs. The service arms have mobilised their writers to prepare a defence. The Times have hosted a set-to between Air-Vice Marshall Tony Mason and Major General Julian Thompson. Mason’s argument is simple: warfare is determined by air superiority. He writes: ‘Since Dunkirk, British Armed Forces have usually fought beneath

Mitchell’s right move

Andrew Mitchell’s decision to prioritise Afghanistan in the development budget is sensible. It demonstrates that Mitchell, a former soldier, understands that the Britain’s overseas aid needs to be in support of Britain’s foreign policy objectives. The Observer reports that Mitchell will announce a 40 percent increase in the Afghan aid budget. This will be paid for both by the increase in development spending and by reducing aid to countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America. I also understand that Mitchell has been emphasising to his department that it needs to work better with the military. For too long, there has been a culture at DFID that has seen it as

Concentration not capitulation

There is a difference between a withdrawal and a retreat. Through no fault of its own, the British army was defeated in Basra and retreated. British troops will withdraw from Sangin in October to be re-deployed to bolster Britain’s main presence in central Afghanistan. Any attempt to present this decision as politically motivated, heralding the start of a British retreat from Afghanistan, should be rejected. British forces have not ‘lost’ in Sangin, or been deemed too ‘soft’ for the task. This is a military decision, inaugurating the surge’s next phase. The logic is flawless. Troops in Helmand have been spread to thin; the Americans and British are concentrating their forces

Might and wrong

‘Was all this the realisation of our war aims?’, Malcolm Muggeridge asked as he surveyed the desolation of Berlin in May 1945. ‘Was all this the realisation of our war aims?’, Malcolm Muggeridge asked as he surveyed the desolation of Berlin in May 1945. ‘Did it really represent the triumph of good over evil?’ All wars pose moral dilemmas for those who fight them, and the Second World War more acutely than most. How many allied lives was it legitimate to risk in pursuit of victory, even over an enemy of unspeakable wickedness? How many enemies was it legitimate to kill? Is the question even worth asking? This admirable book

Afghan manoeuvres

Ming Campbell’s comments today show that some Liberal Democrats do believe in Fox hunting. Responding to Fox’s speech in Washington yesterday and his remark that Britain would be among the last to leave Afghanistan, Campbell told the Daily Politics that the “intervention was unhelpful, indeed the government thought it was unhelpful.” “It would have been better if these remarks had not been made.” Dr Fox’s allies are less than pleased by Ming’s grandstanding. They take the not unreasonable view that the Secretary of State for Defence has every right to express his views on a war that this country is fighting without being second guessed by a backbencher from the

A new foreign policy?

An inventive article from Ben Brogan this morning, arguing that a new vigorously Tory foreign policy is emerging. I can be a little slow sometimes, but I haven’t noticed anything new or Tory about Britain’s foreign policy. Brogan records that the Prime Minister has let it be known that British troops will withdraw from Afghanistan by 2015. Cameron said nothing of the sort; he said he wanted British troops out of Afghanistan by 2015, something quite different. Contrary to expectations, relations with Europe are flourishing under the coalition, as pragmatic government has superseded bellicose opposition. William Hague hopes to influence the EU closely. In a speech today, he will attempt

A mandarin for the moment

Most people probably greeted Liam Fox sacking of Sir Bill Jeffrey, alongside that of the Chief of Defence Staff in that Sunday Times interview with one word – who? The department’s Permanent Under-Secretary –- or PUS — is a pretty unassuming figure especially sat next to the be-medalled soldiers he works with. Few people outside of Whitehall knew who he was before his defenestration; few will remember his name even today. But there is more at work here than one man’s professional demeanor. Britons, despite being reared on the power of officials by TV shows like “Yes Minister”, do not know and do not care about anonymous power-brokers such as

Harman the hawk

Harriet Harman’s response to David Cameron’s statement on the G8 and G20 was noticeable for her attacking the Prime Minister for talking about bringing British troops home from Afghanistan within five years. Her criticism was that talking about withdrawal undermined the troops in the field, she sounded more like John McCain than I ever expected Harriet Harman to. She chose to reinforce her point by using quotes from Liam Fox about the effect that timelines have on military morale. Her use of the Fox quotes suggests that Labour see the Cameron Fox relationship as a weak point in the government. Certainly, Ben Brogan’s blog and Conservative Home’s description of the

Unwinnable war?

Today is Armed Forces Day, and I don’t recall seeing such collective negativity from newspapers and broadcasters on the Afghan war.  It borders on despair. Most news outlets have dissected David Cameron’s comments yesterday, where he could only offer the hope that troops would be withdrawn by the end of this parliament. Cameron’s non-committal answers, the regular drip of casualties and the sense that the surge has become a slog have led journalists and analysts to conclude, en masse, that the war is unwinnable.   Three interviews are particularly striking. Nick Harvey, the armed forces minister, re-iterated Cameron’s comments in the exact same terms. As I argued yesterday, the vague

Aces high

Seventy years after the RAF repelled the Luftwaffe, the Battle of Britain continues to have a powerful resonance. The conflict not only decided Britain’s very survival as an independent nation, but was also imbued with an epic moral purpose. The epochal months of 1940 represented the classic fight between good and evil, between freedom and tyranny, this romantic symbolism given added strength by the soaring rhetoric of Winston Churchill. The 70th anniversary of the battle this summer has prompted a surge of new books and the republication of several old ones. Among the best is the comprehensive new study by James Holland, a historian who has already won international acclaim

Cameron wants troops out of Afghanistan by 2015

Everything about the Cameron government comes in fives. Five year terms, a five-year coalition and now we learn that it is Cameron’s considered opinion that British troops cannot remain Afghanistan for another five years. All Cameron has offered is the hope that troops will be home before the proposed May 2015 election. Five more years in Helmand on the current trajectory would be extremely costly and unpopular, especially given the political pressure surrounding defence cuts. Cameron realises this but will the nature of Britain’s engagement change? The assumption was that Britain would mirror President Obama’s timetable and begin a gradual withdrawal next year. That political and military strategy depended on

Talking to the Taliban is key – but no magic formula

The proverbial shoe is dropping. Following General Stanley McChrystal’s forced retirement, a consensus is forming that President Obama’s Afghan strategy is not working. The Economist says: ‘Since November, when Mr Obama promised 30,000 more of his country’s soldiers to the campaign, little has gone right. General McChrystal’s plan was for a “surge” that would seize the initiative from the Taliban and create the scope for Afghanistan’s government, backed by its army and police, to take charge. In practice that has not happened.’ In the Financial Times, Ahmed Rashid makes a similar point, arguing that the military strategy in Afghanistan is “failing”. ‘The real crisis, however, is that the US-Nato strategy

Hail to the chief

How wrong I was. President Obama, lambasted by his critics for being ponderous, has acted with lightening speed: less than 24 hours after that Rolling Stone article, General Stanley McChrystal was forced out of his job in place of the only person that could pick up where he left off, namely General David Petraeus. In acting swiftly, the US president has moved to restore the authority and respect his position as Commander-in-Chief deserves; and he has begun to re-establish the kind of civil-military relations that need to exist in militarily-capable liberal democracies like the United States.   What effect the change of commander will have in Kabul remains unclear. But

General concern

The Taliban are expanding their area of influence, NATO allies are eager to leave Afghanistan, the forthcoming parliamentary elections are likely to be even more fraudulent than last year’s presidential election – in other words, how can it get any worse for President Obama’s AfPak strategy? Oh yeah, the man the US president has trusted to execute the strategy, the man whose name is now synonymous with the international community’s’ plan, General Stanley McChrystal gives an interview to Rolling Stone magazine (in itself a dubious choice), which paints a picture of the commander as insubordinate, unwise or simply not in control of his headquarters. The fact that everyone has rushed

Why the Bloody Sunday soldiers must not be brought to trial

In The Times today, Danny Finkelstein eloquently sums up why it would be so wrong for any of the soldiers involved in Bloody Sunday to be prosecuted given all that has happened in the peace process: “To stop the killing, we sacrificed principles that should stand above everything. We sacrificed the rule of law and the principle of one law for everybody. We sacrificed justice and accountability to the courts. We bought peace but there is a bill to pay. And today we must pay it.” I must admit to sometimes wondering if the price we have paid for peace in Northern Ireland is too high: that too many victims

The map turns red

Norman Stone forsook the chair of modern history at Oxford university for Ankara after realising that the ‘conversation at high tables would generally have made the exchanges in the bus- stop in the rain outside seem exhilarating’. Norman Stone forsook the chair of modern history at Oxford university for Ankara after realising that the ‘conversation at high tables would generally have made the exchanges in the bus- stop in the rain outside seem exhilarating’. Dur- ing an earlier incarnation at Cambridge, Stone taught a galaxy of historians. His protégés include David Blackbourn, Harald James and Richard Overy, followed by Niall Ferguson and Andrew Roberts, all bar two now working at

The Lib Dems’ turn to convince?

So now it’s the Lib Dems’ turn to present their prospectus for the country.  And, in some respects, I expect they’ll want a fairly uneventful day.  They have, after all, endured the most topsy-turvy campaign of the three main parties so far.  Brown has given us no more, and no less, than what we expected.  The Tories have been riding the crest of a national insurance wave.  But the Lib Dems have bounced around from the highs of Nick Clegg’s performance on Newsnight to the lows of their misleading VAT poster, from their continuing Labservative attacks to Ed Balls describing their schools policy as “creditable” on Sky this morning. Make

Triumph of the will

Alistair Urquhart describes himself as ‘a lucky man as well as an angry man’. Alistair Urquhart describes himself as ‘a lucky man as well as an angry man’. No one who reads his remarkable autobiography will doubt either the phenomenal extent of his good fortune or the extraordinary justification for his anger. Yet his story will be remembered for qualities that are universal rather than personal. At the age of 20, with a job as a warehouseman in Aberdeen, he was called up in 1939 for service in the Gordon Highlanders, and sent to Singapore. When the city suddenly and shockingly fell to the Japanese in December 1941, he was

Progress at a price

I was sitting recently with a former US marine by one of the huge open windows on the top floor of the Caravelle Hotel in Saigon. Our drinks were being served on shiny black tables, and at the bar was a group of rather podgy prostitutes. There is something seedy but fun about the hotel, which reeks of new money: not unlike Saigon — as its inhabitants persist in calling Ho Chi Minh City. Saigon, and indeed Vietnam, has been transformed since the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union unravelled and the Hanoi politburo was forced to water down its rigid Marxism. The cycle rickshaws, peddled by thin men who