Afghanistan

The Tories’ support for the war in Afghanistan owes nothing to neo-conservatism

In his column in the Mail, Peter Oborne writes that Cameron’s stance on Afghanistan represents the same mistake made by IDS in his unstinting support for the Iraq war. Oborne fears that neo-conservatism has gripped the Tory leadership. ‘The ‘Neocons’, despite being discredited by the Iraq war, have furtively regained their position at the heart of the Tory party. Almost without exception, Cameron’s senior team are passionate Atlanticists who seem committed to the policy of ‘reinforcement of failure’ in Afghanistan. Both the Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague and the Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox are ‘Neocons’. As are Cameron’s two most trusted Shadow Cabinet colleagues, Michael Gove and George Osborne.’

Alex Massie

Rory Stewart & Mr Micawber in Afghanistan

From an interesting Jason Zengerle piece in the New Republic: And yet, for all his obvious ambition, Stewart believes the key to any successful U.S. policy in Afghanistan is modesty. “What muddling through is really about is recognizing that we don’t have all the answers,” he says. “It’s not as if we have some amazing high modernist ideology that we’re kind of engineers of the human soul or central planners who are going to come out and create an ideal state. We don’t have that ideological certainty, we don’t know what we’re trying to do, nor do we actually have the power. We don’t have the kind of authoritarian weight

Repeating the same mistakes

The BBC reports that President Karzai has given into mounting pressure and called a run-off, to be held on the 7th November. My gut instinct is that the run-off will prove a costly mistake, in terms of money, men and politics. The sole purpose of these elections is to emphasise that Kabul is the centre of government. That the government’s writ hardly extends beyond the bazaar and its authors are discredited is neither here nor there. It is plain that elements of the Taliban are fighting to protect judicial rights from Kabul’s interference; and presumably, these warlords can be bought through a combination of cash and administrative privileges. As Paddy

James Forsyth

Hard-line Taliban are not ‘al Qaeda lite’

David Rohde’s account of being held hostage by the Taliban for seven months is a fantastic piece of journalism, I’d urge you to read the whole thing. One point in it struck me as particularly pertinent to the current debate about Afghanistan: “Over those months, I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the organization as a form of “Al Qaeda lite,” a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan. Living side by side with the Haqqanis’ followers, I learned that the goal of the

The political position in Kabul deteriorates

It seems that a second Afghan election is now probable after Hamid Karzai’s share of the vote fell below 50%. The BBC reports that the drop is the result of the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission ordering that ballots from 210 polling stations be discounted. The pro-Karsi Independent Electoral Commission will deliver its verdict shortly, but is bound by the ECC, so a run-off seems likely. This turn of events is no surprise – rumours of corruption circulated months before polling. But the coalition is now in a very awkward position. Mr Karzai’s state of mind is frenetic – he views these allegations as more evidence that there is an Anglo-American

The Generals & Their Plan of Attack

Actually, the General Staff’s manoeuvres on Fleet Street have, alas, been rather more successful than their efforts in Basra and Helmand province. I commend*, therefore, Paul Robinson’s article in this week’s edition of the magazine in which he argues that the Generals must take their share of responsibility for recent military failures. More provocatively still he suggests the Army has been saved by Labour since without Tony Blair’s zeal for expeditionary warfare it’s not quite clear what the army would be for these days. There’s something to that in as much as I suspect that if Blair had not committed us to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the MoD

500 more troops to Afghanistan

Gordon Brown’s Afghanistan and Pakistan statement was virtually identical to the joint statement he gave with Battlin’ Bob in August. Once again, the government are pinning their hopes on a tactic called “Afghanisation” – by which they mean conducting operations alongside Afghan forces and police, and the steady extension of Kabul’s authority into the localities. I’ve debated this before, but I doubt that an Afghan police force that is drug tested because its officers consume opium prodigiously can be relied upon to even hand out parking tickets; and, more importantly, Nato’s strategy rests on the contestable assumption that ordinary Afghans believe that Afghanistan exists as a political entity and that

Why are the Pakistani Taliban being given another opening?

There is a depressingly predictable story in The New York Times today about reconstruction in the Swat Valley. Here’s the key section: “the real test of Pakistan’s fight against the Taliban in Swat will take place here, in the impoverished villages where the militant movement began. But more than two months after the end of active combat, with winter fast approaching, reconstruction has yet to begin, and little has been accomplished on the ground to win back people’s trust, villagers and local officials say. The lag, they argue, is risky: It was a sense of near-total abandonment by the government that opened people to the Taliban to begin with, they

Peace in our time

When I first saw the headline Obama wins Nobel Peace Prize, I thought I must have read it wrong. After all, what has Obama actually accomplished in his first nine months in office? (Obviously, that’s not to say he won’t accomplish foreign policy successes in his time in office but he certainly hasn’t yet).   On the foreign policy front, Obama is not actually having much success. Having announced Afghan strategy months into his presidency, he is now reviewing it and seems intent on second-guessing the new commander he appointed. Also for all the goodwill towards him in Europe, he has not got the Europeans to commit substantially more resources

Defensive moves

So, General Dannatt is to be a Tory Peer. This worries me greatly. On balance, General Dannatt did a good job as Army chief. Not a great job, but a good one. His interventions boosted the morale of frontline troops and his concern for the care of soldiers, especially the wounded, was important. Conversely, many defense analysts thought he was too cautious on military reform, blocking the Army’s transformation into an effective counter-insurgency force and opposing stop gap procurement in case it compromised future acquisition projects. But the real concerns over General Dannatt’s ennoblement are different. General Dannatt should have given his sucecssor a clear run at the job. He should

Alex Massie

The Man Who Would Be a Peer: General Sir Richard Dannatt

Plenty of Tories are, it seems, cock-a-hoop about the news, still to be confirmed, that General Sir Richard Dannatt is to be elevated to the House of Lords where he will become a Tory defence adviser and, perhaps, a minister in the next Conservative government. And, in fairness, one can see why the Conservatives would be so pleased. There’s no-one on the Labour benches who brings as much firepower to the political battlefield as General Dannatt. Yet if the government’s criticisms of General Dannatt were, at times, unseemly then so too was his very public dissension from (aspects of)  government policy at a time when he was, after all, in

Dannatt may be overstating his case, but the government is being disingenuous

General Sir Richard Dannatt issues a vociferous condemnation of the government’s commitment to British efforts in Afghanistan in the print edition of today’s Sun. Dannatt asserts that Gordon Brown vetoed increasing the British deployment by 2,000 troops, against the advice of military chiefs. He told the paper: “The military advice has been for an uplift since the beginning of 2009. If the military says we need more troops and we can supply them, then frankly they should take that advice and deploy up to the level we recommend. “If it means finding more resources and putting more energy in, let’s do it. If you’re going to conduct an operation, you’re

Alex Massie

Despite Pundits’ Best Efforts, Afghanistan Stubbornly Refuses to be Obama’s Vietnam

So, you see, Barack Obama is a Democratic president just like Jack Kennedy and LBJ and, right, there’s a war going on in Aghanistan which is in asia, just like Vietnam! So the parallels are just uncanny. Right? Wrong. It’s time, people. for a comprehensive ban on making facile comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam. Prospect’s Tom Streithorst is only the latest fellow to warn that Afghanistan “could destroy Obama’s presidency, as Vietnam did Johnson’s.” This seems extremely unlikely. Let’s trot through some of the reasons: 1. 50,000 Americans died in Vietnam. The current figure for Afghanistan? 796. There may be quite a number of troops involved but Afghanistan is, by

Was Rory Stewart an MI6 Officer?

Was Rory Stewart, Harvard Professor, author of The Places In Between and prospective Conservative parliamentary candidate for the Bracknell constituency, an MI6 officer? Former-ambassador-turned-conspiracist Craig Murray says he was: One person I would not vote for is the crusading neo-Conservative Rory Stewart. It is particularly annoying that he is constantly referred to as a former diplomat. Stewart was an MI6 officer and not a member of the FCO. Three years ago I received a message from the FCO asking me not to mention this as, at that time, Stewart was still very active for MI6 in Afghanistan and his life could have been endangered. I agreed, and even removed a

Mackay and the special relationship

The news that General Andrew Mackay has quit over the government’s failure to properly equip the Afghan mission is significant. For one thing, it will have ramifications for the UK US military relationship. Mackay is the British general from whom General Petraeus feels he has learnt the most; Petraeus affectionately called him the “King of Scotland” in his Policy Exchange lecture the other week. Mackay’s departure will increase the US military’s concern about the war-fighting capabilities of the British military.

Dereliction of duty

The Ministry of Defence is the subject of two very damaging stories this morning. First, there are twice as many former service personnel in prison than there were six years ago. And second, Major General Andrew Mackay, a former commanding officer in Helmand, who masterminded the recapture of Musa Qala, has resigned his commission. Mackay is understood to have been dismayed at the direction of the war and army restructuring. The Independent has the details: ‘Mackay was disillusioned with what he considered to be a failure to carry out adequate reconstruction and development in Helmand. He had said privately that British soldiers risking their lives in the conflict had been

Obama’s choice on Afghanistan

The New York Times reports that President Obama has re-opened internal debate about Afghan policy, suggesting that he is going to u-turn from the counter-insurgency strategy that he announced in March. It seems that Joe Biden, who lost the policy argument last time round, might win out with his argument that, “Instead of increasing troops, officials said, Mr. Biden proposed scaling back the overall American military presence. Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics.” If Obama were to adopt this strategy, it would put

The McChrystal plan

So, the report written by ISAF commander, Stanley McChrystal, to President Obama on NATO’s Afghan mission has been published. It does not contain a request for more US troops, but most analysts think it is only a matter of time before a request is sent from Kabul. In the recently-published report, McChrystal says: “While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.” But serious changes will be required. These will have to address what McChrystal calls “The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials.” The US general also admits “ISAF’s own errors”. Bear in mind, though, that the report was

Decision time for Obama

Bob Woodward has the scoop that General McChrystal’s review of Afghan strategy calls for more troops. McChrystal is direct, stating that “ISAF requires more forces” and that “inadequate resources will likely result in failure”. He is also clear that these troops are needed now, “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” McChrystal has yet to present his request for more troops to the Pentagon but it is clear that he will ask the administration for considerably more troops. Obama now has to decide whether

Petraeus’ lonely fight

At last night’s Policy Exchange lecture, General David Petraeus said he had known the former CDS, Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, since “he was simply Sir Charles.” I met Petraeus for the first time when he was simply a colonel, serving with NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even then he was thought of as a rising star. His leadership in Iraq, first in Mosul and then in Baghdad has only cemented his reputation. Now, however, the scholar-warrior faces his probably greatest task – helping to defeat Taliban insurgents on both sides of the Durand Line. An effort, he said upon assuming command of CENTCOM in 2008, which might turn out to be