Afghanistan

Consensus reigns over PMQs

A very different PMQs this week: six questions on foreign affairs and almost total consensus between Cameron and Miliband. Miliband’s office had given No 10 advance warning of the topics they wanted to raise and the two agreed on pretty much everything. Miliband argued that ‘the best route to stability is through democracy.’ Cameron agreed but stressed that democracy means more than just elections. You get the picture. At the risk of disagreeing with Pete, I must say that the exchanges were a reminder of just how dull PMQs would be if it was not confrontational. For Miliband, the advantage in taking this more considered approach today was that it

Coffee House interview: Paul Wolfowitz

Nobody is as associated with George W Bush’s drive to promote freedom and democracy in the Middle East as former US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. His role in the Iraq War, and belief that the US should promote democracy in a part of the world better known for authoritarian rulers, remains controversial to this day. But now that the Middle East is being rocked by pro-democracy protests – as people demand freedom, employment, and an end to tyranny – is this advocate of democracy finally being proven right? And what does he think about the dangers of democratic transitions? Dr Wolfowitz kindly agreed to answer a few questions about

Coffee House interview: Ursula Brennan

Few government jobs are as demanding as that of Permanent Under-Secretary, or PUS, in the Ministry of Defence. With Liam Fox as your boss, General David Richards as your colleague, and an exhausted, overspent department to run, it is no surprise that when Bill Jeffrey retired many of the government’s most senior officials – including, it is said, No 10’s Jeremy Heywood – balked at the challenge. Forward stepped Ursula Brennan, who until then had held the ministry’s No 2 job before a career in the Ministry of Justice, and what is now the Department for Work and Pensions. Here, Mrs Brennan has kindly agreed to answer a few questions

Sherard v The Generals

As wars begin to end, arguments about their conduct begin. Such is the case with the British campaign in Helmand. In a submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the former British ambassador in Kabul – and one of the best diplomats of his generation – Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles blasted the Army: “Almost by definition, good soldiers are irrepressibly enthusiastic, unquenchably optimistic, fiercely loyal to their service and to their own units within that service, and not especially imaginative.” But his strongest criticism was reserved for the Army’s strategy of seeing Helmand through the prism of the SDSR – looking to save brigades from being cut, not looking primarily to win

Decentralisation key to Afghan pullout, says David Miliband

It is fashionable to ridicule David Miliband’s search for a post-political career. But in yesterday’s Daily Telegraph the former Foreign Secretary showed that – for all his mistakes in office – his intellect, and judgement on a number of key issues, including how to bring the Afghanistan War to an end, was, and remains, razor-sharp: “Afghanistan’s battles are not just between the Afghan and foreign forces and the Taliban insurgency, but between (and within) Afghanistan’s often warring tribes. When Nato trains the Afghan National Army, it’s good – but not if you are a Pashtun who sees the predominantly Tajik army as the enemy.” The South Shields MP goes on

Theatre to mark Western decline

USO is not what it once was. The days of Bob Hope’s wisecracking have receded into the past, and ogled Playmates no longer sex their way across stages. The Pentagon has commissioned British theatrical talent to educate its troops about Afghanistan’s political culture and history. Performed by the Kilburn Tricycle Theatre, The Great Game is a 7 hour show about Afghanistan’s cycles of invasion, struggle and victory. Presumably if the grunts can withstand that, they can withstand anything. As Ben Macintyre notes in the Times (£), there is neither greatness nor beauty in the games that Western powers have played in Afghanistan. But, unencumbered by imperial guilt and hubristic in

A handful of predictions

Here we go. Spurred on by Pete earlier, it’s time for that essential, although often regrettable, end-of-year ritual. Not the prosecco-fuelled partying, but rather something with far more embarrassment potential: predictions for next year. That’s right, amateur guesswork dressed up as serious-ish journalism. Some scribes are better at this than others. Ex-blogger Iain Dale hit the nail on the head by predicting the election of Ed Miliband as Labour leader. In a German aquarium, Paul the Octopus nailed all eight of his predictions for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. By contrast, Mike Adams from NaturalNews probably ought to stop trying to channel Nostradamus. Last year, he predicted that

Help for Helmand

With 2011 promising to be another difficult year in Afghanistan, my friend Alex Strick van Linschoten – a noted scholar of the region – has decided to do something to help. He is organising to get some charcoal to refugee families from Helmand, who have fled the fighting between NATO and the Taliban and now live at a makeshift refugee camp just outside Kabul City. Like millions of refugees, the people at the camp have seen things they will rarely forget: “The sight of a woman’s hair entangled in the mulberry branches, her legs strewn far away in the dirt. Or the sounds they heard as they hid in an underground hole, counting the bombs to

What is the MoD for?

Yesterday, Liam Fox vowed to install a tougher procurement system in the Ministry of Defence and appointed the bureaucracy-busting Bernard Grey as Chief of Defence Materiel. The Defence Secretary said that it is important to start from first principles if reform is to take place. The ministry, he said, “exists to provide the Armed Forces with what they need”. But is that right? The MoD exists, first, to maintain civilian and democratic control of the armed forces; and, second, to support effective operations. Supporting the military is a corollary of the second task, but not the same thing. In desiring to reform the MoD and cut costs, there is a

Richard Holbrooke: Last of the Big Beasts?

In a sense, Richard Holbrooke is one of the few American foreign policy hands of recent years whom one can mention in the same league as the Big Beasts that prowled through the Cold War and the Vietnam disaster (Holbrooke was there too: he wrote one volume of the Pentagon Papers). His death – as Brother Korski says – is a great loss for American diplomacy and the Afghan effort. Holbrooke’s last words (as reported by his family) were “You’ve got to stop this war in Afghanistan” have occasioned much comment. Blake Hounshell, for instance, considers Holbrooke’s views on Afghanistan and asks if, latterly, Dick Holbrooke had discovered a dovish

Holbrooke’s war ends

He was known as brash and abrasive. A gale force wind. The “bulldozer” some called him based on his time bullying Slobodan Milosevic during the Dayton negotiations to end the Bosnian War in the 1990s. However, veteran US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, who died last night, had a far greater register. When he visited London before assuming his latest post, as President Obama’s AfPak envoy, he surprised the US embassy staff by travelling alone, with no bag-carrying entourage, and exhibiting none of the airs he was expected to have. His first experience of the Balkans was not as the all-mighty diplomatic trouble-shooter, but as a normal citizen eager to highlight the

Time for jaw-jaw

Today I joined number of leading Afghan experts, from Ahmed Rashid to Gilles Dorronsoro, in calling on President Obama to change the American strategy in Afghanistan. Based on our work in and on Afghanistan, we wanted to make a number of points just as the White House begins reviewing its strategy: First, that the cost of the war is now over $120 billion per year for the United States alone. This is unsustainable in the long run. Second, despite these huge costs, the situation on the ground is much worse than a year ago because the Taliban insurgency has made progress across the country. The military campaign is suppressing, locally and temporarily, the symptoms of the

Time for an Afghan Inquiry

The Iraq Inquiry had been conspicuously silent, but now John Chilcot’s team has called Tony Blair to give evidence again. It’s expected that our former PM will make the trip to the Queen Elizabeth II centre early next year. That would push the expected deadline for the inquiry’s work finishing – at the end of this year – into 2011. Few people, however, expect the inquiry to say anything novel or get Tony Blair to say anything different than before. Its well-phrased final report may change policy in the margins – but in the security establishment there is little question of what needs doing. RUSI has published reams of reports

Some perspective on the Helmand Wikileaks

Today’s Wikileaks will make uncomfortable reading for all parts of the British defence establishment – ministers, both old and new, and the senior military leadership. As a senior military officer told me, “this isn’t going to be good.” The diplomatic cables reveal that US officials and President Hamid Karzai at some point thought that British forces had bitten of more in Helmand than they could chew. The US NATO commander, General Dan McNeill, is quoted as saying three years ago that British forces have made a mess of Helmand. This is backed up by a comment, more than a year later, suggesting that President Karzai also agreed that British forces

Pakistan’s double game comes under the spotlight once again

The leak that keeps on leaking has one or two embarrassing titbits about our domestic policymakers this morning. Yet far more noteworthy are the documents on Pakistan. While they don’t tell us too much that is surprising – being mostly about the duplicitous game that country is playing with the West – they do highlight some potentially worrying trends. Chief among them is the growing influence of General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the head of Pakistan’s army. His name is littered generously throughout the US briefings, and it is often connected with dangerous conspiracy and double-dealing. One document, for instance, suggests that Kiyani was prepared to overthrow the Pakistani President, Asif

The search for peace leads Britain to pay a Taliban impostor

That the British government paid a substantial sums of money and attention to someone who they thought was Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, a Taliban leader who was the civil aviation minister in the Taliban government, but who turned out to be a shopkeeper from Pakistan shows just how eager Britain is for some kind of political deal that would make it possible for British troops to leave by 2015, the deadline that David Cameron has set. The Washington Post’s piece on the matter, has the Afghan government blaming the mistake on British ‘haste’ for a political settlement.  In The Times the recently retired US representative in Kandahar, reflects that “senior

Pakistan refuses US request to expand drones’ area of operations

Part of what makes the war in Afghanistan so complicated is how easily the Taliban can be supplied from over the border in Pakistan. Pakistan has been more cooperative recently but the Washington Post reports today that Pakistan has refused a US request to expand the areas in which its drones can operate. The Pakistanis are also resisting requests from the US to take a military grip on North Waziristan, a base for several of the groups fighting the US in Afghanistan. Worryingly, the Post quotes a senior Pakistani military official as saying, “You have timelines of November elections and July x’11 drawdowns – you’re looking for short-term gains,” the

Progress towards an Afghan solution?

Nato has agreed to the Afghan plan, or so they say. As Lieutenant-Colonel David Eastman says, Afghan security forces are deemed to be sufficiently capable for the handover to begin next year, as Obama and Petraeus hope. There are those who disagree – some doubt the Afghans, some doubt success itself. Nato secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen may have to be added to that former group of dissenters. He said earlier today: ‘If the Taliban or anyone else thinks they can wait us out, they can forget it.’ The problem for those of Rasmussen’s thinking is that the Taliban can wait; Nato can’t. William Hague has reiterated the government’s promise

Nato – from the glass half empty point of view

Nato leaders are in Lisbon and Daniel Korski has argued that the most successful military alliance in history isn’t done yet. Writing in the Independent, Patrick Cockburn gives an alternative. He contends that Nato will never recover from the Afghan mission, and he has three substantive points: 1). Nato’s solutions are the problem. ‘It is not just that the war is going badly, but that Nato’s need to show progress has produced a number of counter-productive quick fixes likely to deepen the violence. These dangerous initiatives include setting up local militias to fight the Taliban where government forces are weak. These are often guns-for-hire provided by local warlords who prey on ordinary

A 2015 Afghan exit will be tricky

William Hague told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that British combat troops will leave Afghanistan in 2015 – even if parts of the country remain violent. Speaking to a number of senior military officers and civilians who have recently returned from Kabul and Helmand, I have come away with the clear sense – whisper it – that the tactical tide is in fact turning against the Taliban insurgency but that a number of facts will complicate further progress. First, the next few months in Helmand may unfortunately be quite bloody. The drop in British casualties over the summer has made the story disappear from the newspaper headlines but most military