World

In a shocking twist after the last three years of Prince Harry’s perpetual victimhood tour, last night in a live therapy session the prince finally admitted what we’ve known all along: that he isn’t one. Back on the stage for a live streamed Q&A with toxic trauma expert Dr. Gabor Maté, Harry claimed, “I definitely don't see myself as a victim.” You had to pay thirty bucks a head for the pleasure, but boy it was worth it to hear that. Victim, no. Narcissist, maybe. Later in the interview Harry said that sharing his experiences of his terrible life in his bombshell memoir Spare “feels like an act of service.” I’m sure his late grandmother would have different views on what a lifetime of service actually entails.

A British aristocrat and a Florida rapist are hardly a likely pairing; which is why the missing person case of Constance Marten and Mark Gordon enthralled the public this week. In early January, Marten and Gordon went missing with their newborn baby, who was born in the back of their car just two days prior. They set the car on fire with all their belongings inside on the hard shoulder of the M61 motorway in northwest England and ran. First they traveled to Liverpool, then to Harwich in Essex, to Colchester and on to East Ham station in east London. The police were constantly about two days behind them, before the trail went cold completely. Today, police confirmed the couple has been found and arrested — but the search for the baby continues.

As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, today seems as a good time as any to reflect on its first, and see what the future might hold. Six foreign policy experts from across the spectrum of opinion offered their thoughts to The Spectator. As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, how do you foresee the conflict ending? Ted Carpenter: There are several possible outcomes, but the most likely is a ceasefire without a formal peace accord. That move would end the bloodshed, but it would leave the underlying disputes unresolved. Such an outcome would be similar to the armistice that ended the Korean War. It also would create the world’s largest and most dangerous “frozen conflict.

Kharkiv, Ukraine President Joe Biden on Monday showed the world that, as Volodymyr Zelensky said in his London speech two weeks ago, we do not need to be afraid of Moscow. Or maybe we don't need to be afraid so long as Biden is on Ukrainian soil. As I write this, Biden's train has likely crossed into Polish territory, and, on cue, the air-raid alarms are wailing across all of eastern Ukraine. No one I know in Ukraine, where I’ve been since the pandemic and throughout every minute of this war, thinks that Biden's visit accomplished something magical. But it did serve a crucial purpose: boosting the spirits here, amid a week full of warnings that Moscow will do something awful.

President Joe Biden’s administration has announced that he will be crossing the pond to Poland on February 20 through 22, just days before the one-year anniversary of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. Cockburn finds the dates curious — and wonders if the president will make a surprise visit to the epicenter of the conflict on the anniversary itself. The scheduled trip looks like it will already be a busy one, meeting with American allies in the region and reasserting Washington’s “unwavering support for the security of the Alliance.” The real kicker will be if Biden makes his way to Kyiv and meets Zelensky, ending the unfortunate distinction of him being one of the few Western leaders yet to travel to Ukraine.

As the battlefront news for Ukraine turns grim, with even the New York Times conceding that “Ukrainians in [the] East” are “outnumbered and worn out,” the hope, as usual, is that a magic weapon will save the day. We have seen many such invocations in the last twelve months: Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, M777 Howitzers, HIMARS long-range precision missile launchers, assorted Western tanks. All have been hailed in their time as potentially tipping the balance against Putin’s hordes. None have succeeded, or, in the case of as yet undelivered tanks, are likely to succeed, in altering the fundamental military balance in the war, though they contribute much to the balance sheets of the relevant Western arms corporations.