Will Putin’s latest general escalate the war in Ukraine?

So, one granite-faced general has been replaced by another. The announcement that, after just three months in post, General Sergei Surovikin is being succeeded as overall commander of Russia’s war in Ukraine by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov may sound like appointing a new captain for a hull-breached Titanic. But it is significant in what it says, not just about the war, but Putin’s relationship with his generals.

Surovikin becomes one of Gerasimov’s three deputies, in what is being sold not as a demotion but simply a reflection of the need for an ‘increase in the level of leadership’ because of the ‘amplified range of tasks’ and the need for closer cooperation between different military forces. Of course, it is.

The irony is that this is, in effect, a demotion for both men. Surovikin, a ruthlessly competent officer who actually seems to have done more than anyone to try and bring some professionalism to the Russian operation, may to an extent be being thrown to the wolves following the recent deaths of hundreds of soldiers in a Ukrainian missile strike at Makiivka. But he could hardly have transformed the incompetence shown across the Russian military in just three months.

As for Gerasimov, there have been all kinds of rumours lately about his future, some claiming he was out of favour and about to be sacked, others that he had become Putin’s right-hand man and military advisor. Either way, to be put into field command is a kind of demotion, and certainly the most poisoned of chalices.

This is, after all, a thankless job. Every Russian blunder and every Ukrainian victory – and there will be more of both – is now on his shoulders, and it is likely that Putin has unrealistic expectations of what can be achieved. It is worth remembering that not only has the Russian president no meaningful military experience but he is surrounded by a court full of sycophants eager to see someone else take the blame for an invasion they presumably all hailed as a brilliant move at the start.

The appointment confirms what was already pretty much clear: the Russians plan to use the 150,000 mobiks, or mobilised reservists, who they have been training and arming over the winter, for some major offensives. It is unlikely that these will turn the tide of war, though, not least as the Ukrainians themselves are also preparing for battle. In many ways though that’s not necessarily the point.

Putin’s strategy now is predicated not so much on winning the war on the battlefield but on demonstrating to the West that Russia is in this for the long haul, hoping that we will lose the will and unity to continue to support Kyiv. (I think Putin will be disappointed, but he has to believe this – it’s his only real shot at some kind of victory.)

Nonetheless, Putin may be hoping for more than Gerasimov can deliver with his under-trained and under-enthusiastic mobiks equipped with Soviet-era kit. In particular, Gerasimov is unlikely to be any more successful at ensuring cooperation across the Russian forces. Surovikin and all his predecessors found themselves unable to assert their authority over the Wagner mercenary forces under chef-turned-condottiere Yevgeny Prigozhin, or the ‘Kadyrovtsy,’ the personal troops of Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov. Unless Putin is willing to intercede – and this seems unlikely – then Gerasimov is unlikely to be any more successful.

Gerasimov’s career is now hanging by a thread. Despite some conspiratorial suggestions that he is being set up to fail as a pretext for dismissal, this seems unlikely. The war is too important to Putin and, to be blunt, can sack anyone he wants, whenever he wants. Nonetheless he needs some kind of win or a career ends, and in ignominy. He may well be inclined towards some kind of escalation as a result.

It is extremely unlikely that this means the nuclear option about which there has been so much worry. Instead, it could mean another round of mobilisation (if the army has people to train them and weapons to arm them) or, something that makes more military sense but which Putin might veto for its political dangers, deploying conscripts.

So far, the Kremlin has been wary of sending conscripts en masse. However, there are as many as 180,000 of them currently in the ground forces: the annexation of Ukrainian regions provided the Kremlin with a tissue-thin but serviceable legal justification to deploy them and, ironically, they are better trained and equipped than most mobiks.

Whatever happens this spring, this change has underlined the degree to which Putin does not understand about the morale of his generals, or simply doesn’t care. All but installing a revolving door at the joint force command, constantly rotating his (relative) stars, setting them unrealistic expectations and then arbitrarily demoting them is not a recipe to win loyalty. Here and now, this is not a crucial issue, as there is no real threat to Putin. However, just as with the anger and demoralisation of his Rosgvardiya National Guard – who rightly feel they were used as cannon fodder – it may be one of the factors which comes to bite Putin in a real crisis.