Donald J. Trump returns to the Oval Office for the second time as the least interventionist American president since 1941. As the Islamic Republic of Iran – which recently tried to kill him – is at its lowest point in forty years, could the end be near? And what does that all mean for the UK?
The death of the Islamic Republic has been predicted many times before, always prematurely. But today, with the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, economic collapse at home, and an incoming Trump administration, the moment feels different. The Iranian rial is trading at 820,000 to the dollar; it was 59,000 back in 2017. It has lost more than $30 billion (£25 billion) in contracts due to the collapse of the Assad regime. Its advanced air-defence and radar systems were destroyed by Israel in October. Hezbollah has faced a historic setback. Iran also fears unrest at home. We are a week away from the inauguration and the regime is already, in Reaganite parlance, an indisputable “loser”. The Trump doctrine will accelerate that trajectory. This is a good thing.
Iran’s malign influence extends to British streets
As Policy Exchange wrote last year, Iran’s malign influence extends to British streets. It attempted over a dozen terror attacks on the UK last year, one of which succeeded. It systematically attempts to radicalise Muslim communities across the UK through soft power and media influence. In terms of foreign policy, it has spent much of the last twenty years attacking British partners. Over the last two years, Iran has funnelled weapons to Russia to facilitate its war against Ukraine. Across Iran, the regime faithful chant “Death to England” alongside the better-known “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.” The multi-party consensus on Iran has shifted dramatically in a more robust direction; but the effective policy outcomes on the ground do not reflect this, and have been distinctly underwhelming. So, what if the regime can lose harder?
The Trump administration’s return to maximum pressure promises to intensify the squeeze on Tehran. That means targeting oil exports, expanding sanctions, and ensuring its malign influence across the Middle East stays down and recedes even further. That impact could be profound. Iran exports around a million barrels of oil a day, priced at roughly $70 a barrel. Because it relies on smuggling to get around international sanctions, a significant portion of that goes to middlemen. Even if maximum pressure manages to cut Iran’s exports by just a third – a realistic estimate –the choice between guns and butter will become more acute. Its recent choice to boost the defence budget by 200 per cent shows where its priorities lie. Exacerbating the consequences of that choice should be a priority.
In Trump’s first term, the UK sided with France and Germany against the U.S., creating Instex, a mechanism to bypass sanctions. The move fractured the Western alliance and ironically, Instex collapsed under Iran’s own intransigence. Today, British diplomats seem poised to repeat the same mistake as they meet with Iranian officials ahead of Trump’s return.
The regime is, of course, likely to pursue tactical reconciliation to buy itself time. It did so after the Iran-Iraq War and with the Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, under President Obama. By offering minor concessions – a bit more financial transparency here, a little less nuclear enrichment there – Tehran can buy time and give Western diplomats an excuse for self-congratulation. Even entertaining talks in Geneva signals to Tehran that it can rupture the Western alliance again and gain breathing room during a moment of historic vulnerability. There is a better path.
Maximum pressure is not merely about containment; it is about creating conditions for change inside of Iran. This is not the “regime change” of the Iraq War. Change is happening indigenously. By working with Washington to deliver sustained economic, political, and diplomatic pressure, the UK can position itself as a key architect of a post-Islamic Republic Middle East. There are numerous low-cost tools at Britain’s disposal: cracking down on Iran’s shadow tanker fleet, exposing the regime’s corruption through media channels, dismantling Tehran’s networks of influence in the UK, and supporting defectors in ways reminiscent of Cold War policies toward the Eastern Bloc. Above all, Britain must steer European partners away from a conciliatory approach that would grant the regime a lifeline during a moment of profound crisis.
And if it is unwilling to do any of these things? It should step aside. In 1977, two years before announcing his candidacy for the presidency, Ronald Reagan described his foreign policy concept for the Soviet Union in strikingly simple terms: “We win, and they lose.” As a candidate, he explained what that means in practice. The Panama Canal? “We built it, we paid for it, it’s ours and we’re going to keep it.” Arms control? “If they step over the line just once, we’ll step in.” Iran? “Extreme pressure.” More broadly, he insisted that U.S. policy shift from “vacillation, appeasement and aimlessness”, but without “pushing the war button”.
The re-election of Donald Trump recalls the election of Reagan in its palpable shift from malaise to optimism
Sound familiar? The re-election of Donald Trump recalls the election of Reagan in its palpable shift from malaise to optimism (in millennial parlance, that’s a “vibe shift”.) In hushed tones, many Democrats will confess that the new administration’s foreign policy can only be better than the Biden Doctrine. Nowhere is that more-so the case than in the Middle East, where Iran policy offers several opportunities for big “wins.” And that goes for the UK, too.
If Trump’s Reagan-coded optimism was alien to British policymakers back in 2016, it is even more-so the case today. It is hard for Whitehall to imagine winning at a time that the Prime Minister laments, in his words, Whitehall’s comfort with the “tepid bath of managed decline”. Yet the choice is clear. London can help Washington “win”, pursuing its own interests and winning much-needed goodwill. Or it can continue viewing “victory” with condescension.
The question is not whether Iran will lose harder over the next four years. It will. The question for the Starmer government is whether it will help – or hinder – the effort to make it happen.
Jay Mens is a Senior Fellow at Policy Exchange and a co-author of “Crisis and Opportunity in the Middle East: UK Policy Options Towards Iran in 2025”
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