The world after Mubarak

Experts debate what happens next in Egypt and the countries around it

In his retirement, Dwight Eisenhower admitted that the biggest foreign policy mistake of his presidency had been not supporting Anthony Eden over the Suez crisis. How right he was. If Arab nationalism had been strangled in its cradle in 1956 by the vigorous action that Eden, and also initially Hugh Gaitskell, prescribed, then the oil-price hikes of the early 1970s and all the economic woes that flowed from them would never have happened. I doubt there would have been a 9/11, either. Today, instead, we face a situation whereby, since half of Israel’s natural gas consumption comes from Egypt and because of Gaza’s geographical situation, regional catastrophe looms. We should abhor policy created by mobs, and assume that all revolutionary change will ultimately be for the worse, especially in a part of the world with so few model democracies. The future seems to be in the hands of the Cairo mob, which has been irresponsibly egged on by an American president desperate to be seen on the side of the nice middle-class liberals who are always the ultimate losers in revolutions. Far better the American president who said of the Latin American strongman: ‘He may be a sonofabitch, but at least he’s our sonofabitch.’

— Andrew Roberts, historian

The revolt against the Mubarak government is one of those fortunate moments when the United States does not have to choose between its moral sympathies and its strategic interests. Egypt is not a major oil producer like Saudi Arabia, so regime change will not threaten the supply of oil to world markets. US support for Mubarak has also been one of al-Qa’eda’s main reasons for targeting the United States, as well as a useful recruiting tool. Viewed strictly on its own, the US alliance with Mubarak has become a strategic liability, and America should now be seeking good relations with the Egypt that is to come.