The Falklands victory

A little rejoicing is now in order, but only a little. We may rejoice that the Falklands war did not end in a bloodbath at Port Stanley, that the Argentinians did not stage a last doomed defence of the islands’ capital. We may rejoice at the performance of our armed forces who have conducted themselves with great skill and courage and with as much humanity as is possible in war. We may rejoice that they achieved their objectives, for to have lost a war against the Argentinians would have been an unthinkable disaster. We may rejoice that the conflict has accelerated the decline of the British Labour party. We may rejoice that the vain and indescribably stupid leader of the Argentinian junta, General Galtieri, has been frustrated in his imbecile plans of conquest and that Argentina may, as a result, find itself a worthier government.

But has the operation been worthwhile? Has, for example, the British government achieved the two purposes for which it said it was fighting — that armed aggression should not be allowed to pay and that the Falkland Islanders should be allowed to live under the government of their choice? In a narrow sense, the answer is yes.