The United States of China, anyone? The idea that a federal China might be able to accommodate within it a relatively autonomous Taiwan is one of the more radical solutions mooted to the thorny problem of Taiwan’s status. The difficulty, of course, is that neither the Chinese Communist party nor Taiwan’s leaders would find such an outcome remotely acceptable. The CCP will not countenance a loosening of its control over mainland China; the Taiwanese, for their part, see in Hong Kong’s recent sad trajectory a vision of their own future should their politicians ever accept an offer of special status within China.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the possibility that a sacrifice may one day be made of Taiwan by its erstwhile friends around the globe – offered up to China in exchange for a bit of peace and quiet alongside a stable global economy. To many, this smacks of appeasement. Yet any attempt by a powerful and determined China to force Taiwan into the fold would carry extraordinary risks. How many civilian casualties and how much damage to Taiwan’s infrastructure would the island’s leadership tolerate before giving in to Chinese demands? And when push came to shove, how far would the Americans and the Europeans be prepared to go to help Taiwan defend itself? Alongside the appalling economic fallout should maritime trade suffer serious and prolonged disruption there is the prospect of escalation between the US and China culminating in a nuclear exchange.
For Kerry Brown, a former diplomat and now Professor of Chinese Studies at King’s College, London, talk of Taiwan as an international flashpoint tends to obscure the experience of the people who call it home.
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