Regime change in Iran is a bad idea

In 2012, as the Islamic Republic showed signs of buckling under the weight of US and EU sanctions, Senator John Kerry spearheaded a series of backchannel meetings with his Iranian counterparts to begin exploring the deal that became the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an arms reduction agreement between Iran and western nations in which Iran would receive sanctions relief in exchange for caps on uranium enrichment. The US and its allies sought to strike a bargain with an Islamic Republic desperate for foreign investment, eager to accept terms.

Yet in the years leading up to the JCPOA’s signing in 2014, another strand of thought emerged from within US (and Israeli) foreign policy circles: if they could weaken Iran economically to a point where they feel compelled to negotiate, then why not keep up the economic stranglehold until Tehran topples, and then pick up the pieces? The idea inevitably ran aground in the thickets of ‘history’.