Putin, Ukraine and the end of ‘the end of history’

As Vladimir Putin ordered Russian troops onto Ukrainian soil, the initial Western response was swift, if not underwhelming. Trade in Russian debt was curbed and a handful of oligarchs have had their assets frozen. Snarky tweets from an American embassy safely withdrawn to Poland, were also sent. While Russia rolled its tanks across the border, European cities lit up buildings in Ukrainian colours. Perhaps predictably, the threat of these measures and the diplomatic disapproval accompanying them did not dissuade Putin from further action. Hard power, and the ability and will to deploy it, count. Putin has all three; the West does not.

The appeal of sanctions and diplomatic condemnation lies partly in that they are visible and relatively low cost; they offer the trappings of serious engagement in international affairs and the execution of authority without having to turn to harder measures. These are the qualities that have made them the primary tools of Western foreign policy, and which also mean they will only work in limited circumstances.