As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its third week, it is becoming abundantly clear that the Kremlin’s maximalist geopolitical aims of regime change and a ‘greater Russia’ which includes Ukraine and Belarus are no longer achievable. The question now is how much damage will Russian forces inflict on Ukrainian cities and their brave defenders before Putin and his advisors lower their ceasefire conditions to terms that Ukraine’s leaders and population can accept. Ukraine is in a strategically stronger position than many in the West appreciate, but the war on the ground is still stacked in Moscow’s favour in the short term.
The plan to decapitate the Ukrainian state at the national and local levels with infiltrated special forces and operatives, while seizing key points with airborne assaults and surrounding the major cities with ground forces, failed spectacularly during the first week. Having been given next to no warning or time to plan, the Russian army advanced down major roads in poorly coordinated columns and lead elements were largely obliterated by stiff Ukrainian defences.
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