The Libya intervention goes on, with as many question marks hanging over the operation
as airplanes in the sky. What is the aim? Who will run it? Can the United States, Britain and France keep allies such as Turkey on board?
Behind the scenes, officials are said to be looking at various options, including if and how to support the rebels. But the hand-wringing is now even audible across St James Park.
Realistically, the UK should in the first instance work towards establishing a stalemate between loyalists and rebels. From such a stalemate a political process can then begin, which, though it may take many years and continue during the fighting, can help create the foundations for a new Libya. Ideally, that future would not contain Colonel Gaddafi and his family; but, unless the UK is willing to target him specifically, which seems unlikely, or he is toppled, which also seems unlikely, it is best to work off the assumption that he will play some kind of role.
If a stalemate is needed, then the rebels will need external support. It is as simple as that. They need help to organise themselves politically and militarily; and aid to reconstruct the parts of the country under their control.
The UK and France should look to provide the bulk of this kind of support, as nobody else will. Worrying about the consequences of assistance is absurd and time consuming: what is the point of rescuing the people of Benghazi, but letting the inhabitants of other coastal towns die? And, anyway, there is a recent precedent. The UK supported southern Sudan, as if it was an independent country, long before secession. The difference between those who now govern South Sudan and the rebels in eastern Libya is hard to spot.
The UK should use next’s week’s UN meeting to begin coordinating a limited NFZ. I say limited because the “NFZ +” that has developed is clearly too incendiary, in every sense of the word, for many members of the alliance, especially those from the Middle East. A “secretary” should be appointed to coordinate the effort, perhaps former head of UN peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno or retired NATO envoy Mark Sedwill.
Then there is the more delicate issue of aiding the rebels. As the French government has recognised the Interim Transitional National Council in Benghazi, it should organise the necessary but clandestine support. There is a model here too; in fact, there are two. In 1995, Croatian forces were trained by the US firm Military Professional Resources Incorporated, which provided (along with French Foreign Legion) training to allow them to gain control of parts of Croatia which had been claimed by separatist Serbs. Another model is the support the CIA gave the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan: offering intelligence and combat advice.
Finally, a diplomatic team should be ready to bring the loyalists and the rebels together. UN envoy Abdul Ilah Khatib should team up with a European, preferably from a neutral country like Ireland (Isolde Moylan, the Irish ambassador in Beirut?) to prepare the ground for a settlement. Finally, DfiD needs to pay for humanitarian assistance in Ghaddafi-controlled Libya, but have it delivered by another party (UN, EU, NGOs) while it is directly involved in eastern Libya.
In short, the Prime Minister needs to show the same kind of determination he showed when he decided to campaign for the NFZ.
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