There was a time when Ukraine’s accession to Nato was a fantasy. It wasn’t just that Ukraine was dismally poor, politically unstable, or highly corrupt – though all these factors played a role. Nor was it just that Ukraine’s rusting, unwieldy post-Soviet wreck of an armed force was not exactly Nato material.
The bigger reason was Russia. The West wanted to indulge Russia and to partner with it. It wanted Russia to know that while its claims to a special sphere of influence in Ukraine could not be publicly accepted, they could and would be tacitly respected if Russia learned to behave.
Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine upended all that. The Kremlin has burned bridges to the West, blatantly, with great relish, and without remorse. This newly radicalised state no longer has a stake in the European security order. Whatever legitimate security interests Russia may be judged to have had prior to invading Ukraine, it freely and unilaterally abrogated them and thus obviated the need to humour the Russians lest they become upset and throw a fit.
This newly radicalised Russia no longer has a stake in the European security order
Admitting Ukraine into Nato is no longer an outlandish, provocative idea.
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