Has Iran lost control of its proxies?

During a press conference in Tehran at the end of last month, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps spokesman Brigadier-General Ramezan Sharif claimed that ‘the Al-Aqsa Storm was one of the retaliations of the Axis of Resistance against the Zionists for the martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’. It was an extraordinary statement.

Iran had insisted that while it supported the Al-Aqsa Storm (what Hamas calls its 7 October attack), it wasn’t directly involved in its planning or execution. Israeli intelligence believes this to be true. Despite receiving significant Iranian weapons and training, Hamas had not informed Tehran in advance of its plans. So why was Sharif suddenly claiming Hamas acted as part ‘of the Axis of Resistance’ in retaliation for the American assassination in January 2020 of the commander of the IRGC’s expeditionary Quds Force?

Hamas leaders were incensed. In a rare rebuke to the Iranians, they issued a statement denying ‘the validity of the remarks made by the IRGC spokesman regarding the Al-Aqsa Storm operation and its motives’.

The Iranians quickly retracted. The next day, IRGC’s commander-in-chief, Major-General Hossein Salami, made it clear no non-Palestinian parties were involved in the attack. That wasn’t enough: Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, released his own statement, extolling the way ‘the Resistance groups have grown step by step… [they] make their own decisions and judgments’.

Seasoned Iran-watchers looked on with bemusement: the IRGC are not regularly made to squirm by their own proxies. It’s unimaginable this happening under Soleimani, the mastermind who built the network of Iranian influence across the region. But on the fourth anniversary of his death this week, without the magnificent act of vengeance the Iranians have promised ever since, perhaps his lifework should be viewed as an act of overreach. Which is why he met his end in a US drone strike at Baghdad airport.