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During 1956 three major powers made dramatic efforts to prop up their position by the use of armed force. The British and French, in collusion with Israel, invaded Egypt to overthrow its dictator and regain the Suez Canal; their attempt failed within a few hours. The Soviet Union used its tanks to suppress a working-class revolt for the freedom of Hungary; despite the world’s execration they succeeded in re-establishing their control for another 30 years. It was the coincidence of these clashes which made the drama. Both came to a head in the same few days at the end of October.
Peter Unwin comments and analyses these events in the best Foreign Office style — which is a compliment. His writing is not academic; he rations his footnotes and does not enter into long disputation with other historians. Nor does he write as a journalist; he knows that the two disasters need no exaggeration. He is kinder than I would have been to President Nasser but his judgments are shrewd and well argued.
It is not Unwin’s fault that there is not much new to be written about Suez. The facts have been out for several years. It is amazing that Eden should have supposed that it would be possible to keep the collusion with Israel a secret. The invasion plan got as far as it did only because of the huge respect which Eden had built up over his years as foreign secretary. He lost that balance of respect very quickly in the autumn of 1956, but it lasted just long enough for the ultimatum to be issued to Egypt, the fleet to sail from Malta and the parachutists to drop on the Canal.
It was also strong enough to keep Selwyn Lloyd in office as foreign secretary during the critical weeks.
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