Though power has flowed from West to East in recent years, the United States remains a lynchpin of the world order. The election of Donald Trump, a candidate with no political experience and extreme views, is a profound shock to that order, especially if – like us, in Britain – you live in a part of the world which depends on US military muscle. Douglas Murray is relaxed about this prospect, but his argument is based almost entirely on ignoring Trump’s most radical remarks (his astonishing attack on Hispanic judges, for example) and a baffling willingness to believe that Trump means nothing of what he says.
Nato, described by Trump as ‘obsolete’, may not crumble, but faith in Article V, its mutual defence clause, has already been eroded. This changes the psychological balance of power between Russia and Europe, in ways that obviate Russia’s need to even use force. Many central and southern European countries will push for greater accommodation to Moscow, and it will come at the expense of the sovereignty and freedom of those, like the Baltic states, who thought they could count on the West’s most basic institutions.
Britain is, in some respects, uniquely exposed to risks. Ties with Europe are strained, but our intelligence apparatus and, particularly, our nuclear deterrent both rely deeply on US-UK arrangements that date to the Second World War. Our foreign policy and defence posture is vitally dependent on a strong, engaged United States – and that is now in question, unless Trump appoints advisers with far more conservative views than his own. There are rumblings of further EU defence cooperation, but this can’t be meaningful without the involvement of Britain, the continent’s largest power. Should Trump continue to send dangerous signals on Nato, there is simply no alternative to close cooperation between Britain, France, and Germany, and a steady, serious increase in defence spending.
In the Middle East, Trump has sharply criticised Saudi Arabia, but he has also threatened to tear up the Iranian nuclear deal. If he were to make good on this threat while simultaneously pulling back US engagement in the region, the result would be a dramatic increase in Saudi-Iran competition, already growing from Syria to Yemen. Arab states would look to alternative partners, notably Russia, which is already escalating its involvement in Syria, taking advantage of the US’s distraction and anticipating Trump’s stated indifference to the Assad regime’s actions. Trump, fond of strongmen, may move to deepen Washington’s strained ties with Egypt and Turkey, both of whom have drifted away under the Obama administration.
In Asia, this pattern – competition, diplomatic realignment, and uncertainty – is likely to be sharpest. Trump has strongly opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), eroding the economic basis of US leadership in the region. More consequentially, he has repeatedly called into question the US military presence in Japan and South Korea. It is not certain that Trump would pull back from the region at once, and there are plenty of obstacles in his path. But if he does so, some Asian powers will lurch towards Beijing, as Philippines has done, while others might balance, in unpredictable and destabilising ways, against it. South-east Asia’s smaller powers will have to look more to countries like India and Australia. However, any Japanese move towards nuclear weapons would lead to grave dangers. China might initiate a nuclear build-up, which would affect South Korea, Russia, India, and of course the United States. Meanwhile, other states, like South Korea and Taiwan, would take steps to defend against Japan, giving China new opportunities to expand its influence in contested areas like the South China Sea.
We cannot be certain if Trump will govern as he has campaigned. We may hope that he is an opportunist, and not an ideologue, willing to jettison his more radical ideas – contempt for Nato, scorn for allies, indifference towards nuclear non-proliferation – at the behest of more cautious, world-weary advisers. Those around him at present, like former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani, serial crank Newt Gingrich, and the unhinged General Mike Flynn, do not reassure. Trump enters office in a period where a global populist wave has shaken Europe, where the West is losing power, and where the security order in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia has been shaken in different ways. At this fragile time, Trump will bring new and unprecedented stresses. Europe has few good choices. It can retreat into national silos, taking a fatalistic approach to events. Or it can think boldly and imaginatively about the implications of a world where the United States will be less present and less predictable, and work to shape American behaviour in ways that have, at root, worked for us for over seventy years.
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