Max Hastings

How much defence can we afford?

Max Hastings says that the stakes are high for Liam Fox’s strategic defence review: but we must maintain our current troop numbers and cut in other areas to pay for them

issue 19 June 2010

Max Hastings says that the stakes are high for Liam Fox’s strategic defence review: but we must maintain our current troop numbers and cut in other areas to pay for them

Britain’s armed forces are entering a dangerous period of upheaval. The new government’s strategic defence review (SDR) will impose swingeing cuts, and the only uncertainty concerns where the axe will fall. Defence Secretary Liam Fox has announced — in the Sunday Times, rather than to parliament, that the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, will step down in the autumn.

Stirrup will therefore remain as a lame duck while the SDR is carried out. This is deliberate. Fox wants to emphasise that the SDR’s outcome will represent the intentions of government, which a new CDS will then be required to carry out. He thus hopes to avoid the tribal warfare he believes inescapable if a soldier — almost inevitably a lobbyist for the interests of his own service — takes over immediately.

The next CDS will be either the head of the army, Gen. Sir David Richards, or the Vice-Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Sir Nick Houghton. Houghton is a clever and personable Yorkshireman, who has performed very well in his present role, but the army would prefer Richards. He has been tested in important operational commands, and has shown himself clear-thinking, forceful and outspoken.

The latter qualities are by no means always welcome to politicians. Fox was no more enthusiastic about the perceived politicisation of former head of the army Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt than was the last Labour government.

Striking a balance between obedience to government decisions and independence of view is hard for every CDS — Charles Guthrie was the last worthy incumbent. When David Cameron makes his choice, he may want to remember that some notable recent strategic blunders — including the 2006 under-strength Helmand deployment — took place because successive chiefs of defence staff were too eager to fall in with government wishes.

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