Germany needs to break its dependence on China

Back in February, Olaf Scholz gave one of the most important speeches in his country’s post-Cold War history.

In it, the German Chancellor announced that the Russian invasion of Ukraine had produced a zeitenwende, or turning point, and that German policy must adapt. No longer could his nation live on the so-called peace dividend that the West has enjoyed for nearly three decades, and no longer could Germany be dependent on cheap Russian gas. Within three days of Vladimir Putin’s invasion Berlin had U-turned and promised to give Ukraine lethal aid, to spend a one-off $110 billion on the Bundeswehr (the German military), and to spend 2 per cent of GDP on defence. The failed policies of Scholz’s predecessors that brought Germany so close to Moscow were utterly rejected. The country had learned its lesson.

Or so it seemed. While Scholz has stuck to almost all the promises he made that day, German foreign policy towards the other major threat to world peace – China – has not fared so well.