There are four major power blocs in the world — the United States, Russia, China and the EU. Of these, only the EU does not provide for its own defence and security. Remarkably, nearly 75 years after the end of the second world war, Europe is still heavily dependent upon the United States for its defence. But it is hardly surprising that, in the Trump era, pressure has grown for an autonomous European defence policy.
The question of how Europe is to be defended in the post-Brexit era has yet to be examined. The EU has, for some years, been seeking ‘strategic autonomy’, though it is never wholly clear precisely what that means. But in February 2015, Ursula von der Leyen, the German defence minister, called for a European army, a call echoed by Jean-Claude Juncker a month later, who declared that such an army would convey to Russia ‘that we are serious about defending the values of the EU’. More recently, Emmanuel Macron has given his imprimatur to the idea. In his 2017 Sorbonne speech, he spoke of Europe developing ‘autonomous operating capabilities’, a concept as nebulous as ‘strategic autonomy’.
Britain has always, with good reason, been sceptical of an integrated European defence policy, believing that it would undermine Nato and divert energies better applied to strengthening it. Moreover, such a policy could, in theory, require that a country would be committed to war against its parliament’s own wishes; while if military action required unanimity, every member state would have a veto, and that would guarantee that nothing would be done.
In the major foreign policy crises of the past two decades — Kosovo and the Iraq war — Europe has been divided, while today EU members such as Austria, Cyprus, Hungary and Italy find themselves more sympathetic to Russia and China than do the vast majority of member states.
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