Beyond Brexit: how to unlock our global potential

Back in spring 2016, Boris Johnson charmed voters by promising that Brexit would be a chance to build a ‘global Britain’. This optimistic idea quickly cut through with the British public, becoming a rallying call for globally-minded Brexiteers (and also inspiring one of The Spectator‘s most memorable covers).

Five years on and Boris Johnson finds himself in a very different position: heading a government tasked with making that vision a reality. This spring, he unveiled a large document he promised would do just that: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. This, he said, would be the guide to ensuring Britain remained ‘match fit’ to defend its interests in an increasingly-competitive world.

But how does it stack up? As part of our Global Britain summit (kindly sponsored by BAE Systems), The Spectator brought together Sir Roger Carr, BAE Systems’ Chairman and foreign policy experts to discuss this new vision for British foreign policy, with Andrew Neil in the chair. Had it correctly diagnosed the biggest threats to the UK’s interests and prosperity? And does it set out a realistic plan to address them? And what would it all mean for our role in the world?

Giving an industrial perspective, Sir Roger Carr endorsed the Review. ‘The government’s prosperity agenda is closely aligned with the security needs of the United Kingdom and the commitments made are particularly welcome in the midst of post-Brexit and pandemic disruption’ he said. ‘It’s a very ambitious document that sets out a coherent, long-term vision for UK foreign policy,’ agreed Stephen Booth, head of Policy Exchange’s Britain in the World Project. In particular, he added, the Review made clear that Britain’s economic interests were increasingly ‘intertwined’ with questions of security – and that foreign policy remained a vital tool for delivering domestic economic prosperity.

For Sophia Gaston, director of the British Foreign Policy Group and a self-confessed ‘optimist’ about global Britain, the Review was a strong start. Questions remained, though, about the role of China, which Downing Street now defined as a ‘strategic competitor’; rather than an outright adversary or a priority trading partner. ‘If we are pursuing a balanced approach to China, we need to reconfigure the machinery of government to manage that,’ she said.

As one of parliament’s most prominent China critics, Tom Tugendhat was more stringent in his criticism. The government needed to be much clearer, he said, on the threat posed by China, which was playing a more confrontational role than the Review had let on. This soft approach was reminiscent, he said, of the government’s slowness to defend strategic technologies against Chinese takeovers: most recently, the proposed takeover of semiconductor firm Newport Wafer Fab.

‘We are seeing a very different relationship towards China from a few years ago, but the reality is that this government’s view on economic relations with Beijing is much more optimistic than many members of the Conservative party would like to admit.’ He suggested there were also other diplomatic factors at play. ‘They want Chinese cooperation at COP 26, so they’re being careful not to scare them out of the room beforehand,’ he said.

As part of its strategy to keep China at bay, the Review had committed Britain to a bigger role in the Indo-Pacific: an area which, as Stephen Booth explained, was increasingly emerging as the most vital region for global trade (not least the world’s largest trade deal, the CP-TPP). But were Britain’s ambitions really realistic in a region already dominated by both larger and local powers – not least China and the US? Surely no-one seriously expected Britain to be a super-power, asked Andrew Neil.

Stephen Booth was optimistic. ‘Look at the enthusiasm countries have for a greater British role in the region,’ he said. Countries like Japan are increasingly aware of the role we can play, and are keen for us to join CP-TPP.

Sir Roger gave a similar pragmatic analysis. ‘We might not be a global superpower, but we are a very important part of a global network,’ he said. British products and technologies, he added, were increasingly sought out by many of the larger players in the region – including the US and Australia – as vital to their own capabilities. This, in turn, benefited our economic and diplomatic partnerships with these longstanding allies.

But did Britain need to think about the staying power of its allies, asked Andrew Neil – in particular after recent events in Afghanistan? ‘I don’t agree with this framing of America being in retreat from the world, but it’s clear that it’s definitely reevaluating its global security role,’ said Sophia Gaston. This would have particular consequences, she added, in Europe, where the US was continuing to reduce its footprint. This was a chance not just for the EU to think about its own role as a foreign policy actor, but also for the UK to reaffirm its commitment to European security (as, indeed, the Brexit campaign had promised to do).

Given the complexities of foreign policy, how could Britain know if its new approach was successful? For Tom Tugendhat, there was a simple test. ‘What matters is how we turn our global footprint into something that actually delivers prosperity and happiness for the British people.’ Getting that right would be the ultimate proof that Global Britain had gone from slogan to strategy: and that Britain was back on the world stage for good.