After Rome defeated Carthage in the first Punic war (264–241 bc), it annexed Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica and maintained its interest in the Carthaginian heartlands of North Africa and Spain. So when Hannibal, elephants and all, marched through Spain and southern Gaul and descended over the Alps into Italy to start the second Punic war (218 bc), he was out to remove the Roman threat to Carthage’s western ambitions.
Whether he wanted actually to take Rome or not, his basic aim was to weaken Rome by drawing away its Italian allies. To this end he had brought with him about 60,000 battle-hardened troops (and 37 elephants). His tactics and their experience were instrumental in their first devastating victories. After Trebia (218 bc), Trasimene (217 bc) and Cannae (216 bc) Rome had lost at least 100,000 killed or captured (over 10 per cent of those eligible for service), with severe losses among its political elite too. Hannibal was also winning the propaganda war. He released all Italian soldiers back to their homes, and most of southern Italy defected to him. Meanwhile Rome suffered further horrendous losses against Gallic tribes taking advantage of Hannibal’s incursion to push into northern Italy. The game was up: Rome had to surrender.
Later generations were to see this moment as Rome’s finest hour. Rejecting all negotiations, the Romans regrouped, raised fresh troops and re-adopted Fabius Maximus’ famous delaying tactics, harrying Hannibal but not confronting him in pitched battle. Italian towns that defected were bloodily brought to heel when Hannibal had moved on. Hannibal was unable to reinforce his army substantially either through defecting Italians or with fresh troops from Carthage (he could not gain control of a port), while Rome’s massive manpower enabled them to keep numbers up.
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