Charles Lipson

Just how long can Russia sustain the war in Ukraine?

A Ukrainian soldier walking through a lumber mill recently rocketed by withdrawing Russian troops (photo: Getty)

The sheer complexity of the war in Ukraine can mask its most important features. So let’s cut through the complexity and focus on where the combatants now stand, how they got there, and what is likely to happen next.

The central point is one we all know: Ukraine has prevented a Russian victory but has not yet won the war. There is still hard fighting to come, but the battlefield is increasingly tilted in Ukraine’s favour. Vladimir Putin wanted to seize the capital, decapitate the Zelensky regime, install a puppet government, and control as much of the country as he could, incorporating some of that territory into Mother Russia and establishing “independent” republics in the rest. Not only did he fail militarily, he united the Ukrainian people in fierce opposition, including those who speak Russian, live near the border, and once favoured Moscow. This broad opposition forged a nation and marks a significant change since Russia’s seizure of the Crimea and Donbas region in 2014.

Putin’s invasion and Ukraine’s resistance has three immediate consequences. First, it has fuelled the fighting spirit of all Ukrainians, led by a smart, tenacious army and Churchillian president. Second, it means that, outside Crimea, Russia can only control the territory it seizes with a permanent occupying army. That’s expensive and dangerous. Third, it dashes any hopes Putin may have had for ruling the country with a proxy regime that could defend itself.

Putin also failed in his larger diplomatic aim: fracturing NATO. Worse for him, he managed to reactivate the sluggish alliance, solidify it behind Ukraine, and prompt the addition of two more countries, Finland and Sweden, both with histories of neutrality. Finland’s membership in particular poses a major strategic challenge for Russia, since they share an 870-mile border, which comes near St. Petersburg.

Equally important, NATO’s war aims have expanded as the fighting has continued.

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Written by
Charles Lipson
Charles Lipson is the Peter B. Ritzma Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Chicago, where he founded the programme on International Politics, Economics, and Security.

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